In its judgment of 6 October 2026 (Case No. 33 O 2062/25), Munich Regional Court I (Landgericht München I) held that charge point operators may not place third-party mobility service providers at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their own end customers by imposing higher electricity prices or additional overstay fees without objective justification. Although the prohi-bition of discrimination under Article 5(3) of the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation (AFIR) does not require uniform pricing, any price differentials must be supported by specific, verifiable cost calculations and must be proportionate. The burden of pleading and proof rests with the charge point operator. In the case at hand, the Court ordered EWE Go to cease the contested pricing practices and declared it liable for damages arising from the infringements.
The judgment thus places limits on the practice of disadvantaging independent mobility ser-vice providers through wholesale prices exceeding the operator’s own end-customer tariffs, at least where the price differentials cannot be adequately justified. Going forward, charge point operators will need to examine more carefully whether, and on what objective grounds, they can justify charging different prices to third-party mobility service providers.
Background
The claimant operates as a mobility service provider (“MSP”), supplying electricity for electric vehicle charging to end customers. It does not operate its own charging infrastructure but instead enters into agreements with charge point operators (“CPOs”), purchases electricity from them and resells it to end customers in its own name and for its own account. The CPO thus acts as its upstream supplier. From an energy industry perspective, this arrangement takes the form of an electricity supply arrangement known as Beistellung. The corresponding supply charge is determined by the CPO, in this case through the so-called “Offer2All price”.
The defendant, EWE Go, operates its own charging network as a CPO while also supplying charging electricity directly to end customers, both on an ad hoc basis and under contractual arrangements. It therefore competes with MSPs for the same end customers.
The dispute concerned a high-power charging (HPC) session in Munich on 1 January 2025. The claimant paid the Offer2All price of EUR 0.837/kWh (including VAT). Until 31 January 2025, ad hoc customers paid EUR 0.790/kWh, meaning that the claimant was charged 4.7 euro cents more per kWh. Customers with contractual arrangements paid EUR 0.520/kWh. In addition, EWE Go imposed an overstay fee of EUR 0.10 per minute (excluding VAT) from the 45th minute onwards, but only on the claimant.
Decision of Munich Regional Court I
The mobility service provider challenged these practices in court. Munich Regional Court I has now upheld the claim, delivering the first judgment in proceedings of this kind. The Court found both the higher charging electricity prices imposed on the MSP and the overstay fee charged exclusively to it to be unlawful. According to the Court, the pricing practices infringed the prohibition of discrimination under the second sentence of Article 5(3) AFIR, which consti-tutes a rule governing market conduct and is therefore also enforceable under Section 3a of the German Act Against Unfair Competition (UWG).
Under the second and third sentences of Article 5(3) AFIR, operators of publicly accessible recharging points must not discriminate, through the prices they charge, either between end users and mobility service providers or between different mobility service providers. Differen-tiated pricing is permissible only where it is objectively justified and proportionate. Although the provision does not impose an obligation to charge identical prices or confer an entitlement to any particular price, the permissibility of a price differential is subject to full judicial review. Ultimately, what is prohibited is the unequal treatment of comparable situations. The burden of pleading and proving that price differentials are justified rests with the CPO.
Applying these principles, the Court found that EWE Go had infringed Article 5(3) AFIR. Compared with the ad hoc tariff, the claimant had been treated unequally because it paid EUR 0.837/kWh rather than EUR 0.790/kWh. The claimant’s position was comparable to that of EWE Go’s end customers. The prohibition expressly extends to discrimination between end users and mobility service providers. Moreover, an end customer of the claimant would, if paying EWE Go directly, be charged the higher Offer2All price rather than the ad hoc tariff. The Court also found an infringement in relation to EWE Go’s own contractual customers. EWE Go’s argument that it acted not as a CPO but as an MSP when supplying its own con-tractual customers was rejected, since allowing such a distinction based on market roles would enable operators to circumvent the prohibition of discrimination. Finally, the overstay fee imposed exclusively on the claimant likewise required objective justification.
The Court found no justification for the price differentials. Although higher billing, service and default-related costs could, in principle, justify a surcharge for MSPs, EWE Go had failed to demonstrate that the specific surcharge over the ad hoc tariff corresponded to such additional costs. No comprehensible cost calculation had been provided. Furthermore, the ad hoc tariff effectively operated as a price ceiling for MSPs. If their purchase price exceeded that tariff, they could not offer their end customers a competitive rate without incurring losses. The same reasoning applied to the substantial differential of 31.7 euro cents/kWh compared with EWE Go’s own contractual customer tariff. This differential was unjustified because EWE Go had failed to quantify the alleged cost differences in commercial terms. A transparent break-down of costs was particularly necessary in view of such a significant price disparity. Nor was the overstay fee justified. While such fees are permissible in principle to prevent charg-ing points from being occupied unnecessarily, EWE Go had failed to explain why the fee was imposed on the claimant but not on its own customers, while exemptions had been agreed with other MSPs.
The Chamber expressly left open the question of what price differential might still have been justified, as the factual basis necessary for such an assessment was lacking.
Legal Assessment and Practical Implications
The judgment marks an important step towards ensuring fair conditions of competition in the EV charging market. Even before the AFIR entered into force, competition law discussions had addressed the extent to which charging infrastructure operators could disadvantage in-dependent charging electricity suppliers by imposing excessive wholesale prices compared with the prices charged in their own retail business (see von Hammerstein/Roegele, EWeRK 2019, 221). Subject to the requirements of Article 102 TFEU, such pricing practices may constitute an exclusionary abuse in the form of a margin squeeze. These competition law concerns are also reflected in the sector inquiry conducted by the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt). In addition, the German legislature has introduced a further mech-anism to strengthen competition at charging stations through the right to third-party electricity supply under Section 7c of the German Energy Industry Act (EnWG). Article 5(3) AFIR now complements these instruments by establishing a specific prohibition of discrimination that does not require proof of a dominant market position.
However, Article 5(3) AFIR does not establish a general obligation to charge identical prices. Rather, the decisive question is whether specific price differentials are objectively justified and proportionate. The burden of pleading and proof in this respect rests with the CPO.
The judgment is likely to have significant implications for the EV charging market, and numer-ous further proceedings can be expected. Studies of charging electricity prices reveal sub-stantial price disparities and high charges at publicly accessible charging stations. The prob-lem is exacerbated by the fact that individual charge point operators dominate the market in many regions. Consequently, in addition to claims under Article 5(3) AFIR, competition law claims based on an abuse of a dominant position may also arise. Of particular significance in this context are the rights to information recognised by Munich Regional Court I, which may enable affected mobility service providers to obtain greater transparency regarding pricing practices and quantify potential damages claims.
For charge point operators, the judgment means that, going forward, they must be able to substantiate price differentials imposed on independent mobility service providers through transparent cost calculations and objective justification. General references to differing cost structures, default risks or customer loyalty will not suffice. Overstay fees must likewise be structured in a non-discriminatory manner. For mobility service providers, the decision opens up the possibility of challenging unjustified price differentials under the AFIR in conjunction with the UWG, without having to establish the requirements of Sections 19 and 20 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB).
For charge point operators, the judgment means that, going forward, they must be able to substantiate price differentials imposed on independent mobility service providers through transparent cost calculations and objective justification. General references to differing cost structures, default risks or customer loyalty will not suffice. Overstay fees must likewise be structured in a non-discriminatory manner. For mobility service providers, the decision opens up the possibility of challenging unjustified price differentials under the AFIR in conjunction with the UWG, without having to establish the requirements of Sections 19 and 20 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB).
(6 October 2026)